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I. Abstract
Motor vehicle use in the United States creates considerable social harms, costing Americans hundreds of billions of
dollars per year, which are not reflected in prices paid by
drivers. This article presents a framework for developing
roadway pricing measures specifically targeted to the major
harms caused by vehicle use, that would collect over $300 billion annually. Five measures are presented: congestion pricing, smog fees, weight-distance charges, gasoline taxes, and
violator fines. No single measure would be responsible for
capturing more than one-third of the total revenue. Two additional measures would restructure key components of the
costs to drive to make them more transparent to motorists:
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cashing-out free parking, and pay-at-the-pump insurance.
Phased adoption of these measures over the next several decades could help reduce single-occupant driving, reverse suburban sprawl, and make transportation in America less
costly to individuals, society and the environment.
II.

Preamble

Motor vehicles present America with a paradox. Not
only do they play a central role in economic activity as the
nation's primary source of transportation; but they are fundamental to the Americans' conception of mobility and personal
autonomy. Cars and trucks have so profoundly shaped modern America that few of us can imagine life without the present level of vehicle use. At the same time, however, motor
vehicles are a major source of disbenefits. Specifically, pollution, accidents and congestion from car and truck use strain
household and civic budgets, harm people and communities
and damage the natural environment.
The discipline of economics offers a two-step approach to
such a paradox: first, estimate the extent of these motor vehicle costs; second, craft mechanisms to internalize these
costs into the price of vehicle use, so that individual decisions
on whether and how to drive fully reflect the cost of driving to
society. This article is organized along those lines; it first
summarizes the various social and environmental costs of car
and truck use, and then outlines seven complementary
means to make the price of driving better reflect its costs.
However, it should be said at the outset that America is
far from any consensus about the merits of raising the price
of driving in order to diminish the harms that driving creates.
Indeed, despite widespread frustration over pollution, congestion, accidents and other consequences of motor vehicle
use, there is no consensus about the costs and benefits of the
nation's reliance on the automobile. The researchers and activists who have spotlighted this issue in recent years will
need to redouble their efforts so that motor vehicle harms and
potential remedies, including pricing, can be fully debated.
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In addition, the social and political consequences of fullcost pricing of motor vehicle use need to be investigated far
more fully. Impacts on the poor and other at-risk groups
must be a major concern; this paper touches on them, but a
far more thorough treatment is needed. The ultimate implications of full-cost pricing on the United States economy also
require full discussion. Even if phased in over a long period
of time, full-cost pricing will almost certainly lead to fewer
miles driven by fewer cars on fewer roads. The potential consequences of such a change are vast. Opening up the American political system to explore the social and cultural
dimensions of auto-dependence is an essential undertaking.
III. Introduction
Motor vehicles are America's primary means of transportation. They are fundamental to commerce, recreation and
daily life. Almost nine-tenths of person-miles traveled and
one-third of intercity freight movement in the United States
are by cars and trucks.1
Yet operation of motor vehicles damages the environment and harms individuals and society. Combustion of motor fuels pollutes the air and accelerates global warming.
Petroleum extraction damages human settlements and wildlife habitat. Transporting and refining crude oil into gasoline
further pollutes air, land and water. Noise from vehicle traffic creates stress and disrupts daily life.
Roads increasingly are built larger, wider and faster, to a
scale that overruns urban communities, trashes landscapes
and destroys wilderness. Vehicle crashes kill 40,000 people a
year in the United States and cause hundreds of thousands of
serious injuries. Traffic congestion steals time and equanim1. Motor vehicles accounted for 88.2% of person miles in 1990 (excluding
school bus travel); FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF HIGHWAY
MANAGEMENT, 1990 NATIONWIDE PERSONAL TRANSPORTATION SrUDY, EARLY RESULTS, 24 tbl 6, Person Miles of Travel By Mode. Trucks accounted for 32.8% of
United States intercity ton-miles in 1991 (excluding pipelines and coastwise
shipping). ENO TRANSPORTATION FOUNDATION, INC., TRANSPORTATION IN
AMEniCA, 1992, 44 tbl., Intercity Ton-Miles By Mode. Including intracity
freight movement raises trucks' modal share significantly.
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ity from drivers, passengers and from non-motorists caught
in gridlock.
The total cost of these harms is enormous. Recent studies estimate United States motor vehicle costs to society and
the environment at upwards of several hundred billion dollars annually. 2 An extensive analysis by this author puts the
cost at roughly $700 billion a year,3 equal to one-eighth of
total gross domestic product. 4 By comparison, United States
electricity generation, the object of a concerted effort by environmental advocates to reduce ecological damage, generates
annual harms estimated to cost only $120 billion. 5 Motorists
themselves bear much of society's costs from driving, in terms
of time lost in traffic, lives lost in road deaths, et cetera. Nevertheless, as discussed below, almost all vehicle harms qualify as externalities-costs borne by individuals and groups
that do not participate in or benefit directly from the transac6
tion that imposes the costs.
Internalizing these costs could benefit society significantly. Charging drivers for the harms their driving imposes
would create incentives for individuals to seek out alternative
means of travel and to drive in ways that are less harmful
socially. Government could invest the revenues from these
charges in alternative modes, to make them at least as satisfactory as car and truck use. Choices would be expanded and
2. JAMEs J. MAcKENzIE Er AL., THE GOING RATE: WHAT IT REALLY COSTS
TO DRIVE, WoRLn RESOURCES INSTITUTE (June 1992) (estimating the external
costs of United States motor vehicle use at more than $300 billion a year). PETER MILLER & JOHN MoFFET, THE PRICE OF MOBILITY: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (Oct. 1993)

(estimating the external costs of United States passenger vehicle travel (excluding freight trucks) at between $380 and $660 billion a year).
3. Charles Komanoff & Brian Ketcham, Win-Win Transportation: A NoLosers Approach to Financing Transport in New York City and the Region (July
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Komanoff Energy Associates).
4. United States Gross Domestic Product in 1990 was $4.897 trillion, in
1987 dollars. The GDP Deflator indicates a 12.9% increase in price levels during 1987-90, making the amount $5.53 trillion in 1990 dollars.

5. See

RICHARD OTTINGER Er AL., ENVmONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY

(1990). Externalities therein in 1989 dollars per kWh for each fuel (Coal 5.80,
Oil 3.8o, Nuclear 2.90, Gas 1.0o, Hydro 0.10), multiplied by 1992 net generation, yields $115.7 billion; converting to 1990 dollars gives figure in text. Id.
6. See infra § V.
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the total cost of transportation including externalities would
be reduced. Equity and efficiency would both be served: equity, because the costs of harms would be shifted onto those
benefiting from the activity; and efficiency, because travelers
would be encouraged to select the most socially beneficial
travel option for each trip.
This paper identifies seven policy instruments for internalizing harms from motor vehicle use. One of them-a tax
on gasoline-is already in place, but revenues from it are currently applied to pay for road construction and maintenance,
leaving nothing to defray the harms caused by gasoline's production and use. 7 Moreover, as this article will argue, gasoline taxes alone are a very poor means of internalizing the
costs of driving. As will be seen, the harms from driving are
so various, and their extents differ so widely depending on
the nature and use of the vehicle, that only a broad array of
targeted instruments can internalize costs effectively and
fairly.
IV. Motor Vehicle Costs
Costs created by driving can be divided into three types:
motorists' direct out-of-pocket costs for gas, depreciation and
insurance; taxpayer costs to finance road building and maintenance; and social costs like time lost in traffic and lung
damage from air pollution borne directly by drivers and indirectly by everyone else.8 All three categories are large, and
all appear to be growing.
A. Motorists' Direct Costs
Motor vehicle maintenance absorb huge amounts of
money from its owner-operators. Passenger car owners
spend a half-a-trillion dollars a year for gasoline, depreciation, insurance, parking and upkeep-an average of $3600
7. A small piece of federal gas tax revenue-just over $1 billion a year-is
set aside for the Mass Transit Account (at the rate of 1.5C/gallon) and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund (0.1C/gallon).
8. This typology excludes motorists' non-monetized costs, such as time.
Travel times for different commuting modes are treated in Apogee Research,
Inc., CONSERVATION LAW FoUND., Tim COST OF TRmSPORTATION (Jan. 1994).
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annually per car.9 Moreover, as destinations spread beyond
the convenient reach of walking, bicycling or transit, families
increasingly rely on two or even three cars, which strain
household budgets. However, these costs are internal-motorists receive direct benefits for their expenditures on driving-and thus, are not the primary concern of this paper.1 0
B.

Governmental Costs

Notwithstanding monies that motorists pay in gasoline
taxes, tolls and parking tickets, the public sector collects considerably less money from drivers than it spends to build,
maintain and control highways. In New York State, for example, public agencies at all levels of government spend
roughly $7 billion annually on roads, while collecting only
$4.5 billion in motorist user fees. This indicates that New
York drivers are subsidized by taxpayers at a rate of $2 billion or more a year. 1 Similar analysis for the entire country
indicates that taxpayers subsidize drivers at a rate of between $20 and $30 billion annually, in effect paying through
income, property and sales taxes for government to build,
12
maintain and control roads.
C.. External Costs
External costs include human mortality and morbidity
from air pollution and vehicle accidents, the psychological effects of car noise, time lost by traffic congestion, and land lost
to highways. As noted, these costs are as high as $700 billion
a year. A summary of the major costs follows.
9. Frank A. Smith, Transportationin America, ENO TRANsp. FOUND., INC.
at 40, 42, 63 (1992) (lists 1990 United States auto (passenger vehicle) costs at
$523.5 billion for 143.5 million autos or $3,648 per vehicle per year. An additional $270.6 billion was spent in 1990 on 44.5 million trucks).
10. This is not to say that car owners have necessarily chosen freely to own
cars and bear the associated costs. A host of interrelated factors, including relocation ofjobs and stores to the suburbs, transit cutbacks, the perceived insecurity of walking or cycling, and social pressure increasingly make automobile use
a necessity rather than a matter of consumer choice.
11. CoRA ROELOFS & CHARLES KOMANOFF, Sunsmrss FOR TaFrmc: How
TAXPAYER DOLLARS UNDERwRTE D~mvNG fN NEW YoRK STATE

(Tri-State Trans-

portation Campaign, ed. Mar. 1994).
12. Id.
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Societal Costs of Roadway Transportation

Five categories dominate motor vehicle harms: accidents, congestion, air and noise pollution, lost land, and energy-related costs. Table 1 provides estimates of the societal
cost of these harms and, for completeness, lists direct taxpayer subsidies to motor vehicle use, in four ways:
(i) total (for society as a whole);
(ii) amounts borne by drivers;
(iii) amounts borne by the public; and
(iv) costs that are ripe for user fees.
Following is a brief explanation of the estimates in Table 1.13
"HIDDEN" COSTS OF ROADWAY TRANSPORT IN THE UNITED STATES

(billionsof 1990 dollars,per year)
Cost Category

Total

Borne by
Drivers

Borne by
Public

Ripe for
User Fees

1.
2.

Accidents
Congestion

$319
168

$270
143

$ 49
25

$ 49
50

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Air Pollution
Land
Energy-related
Noise
Tax Subsidy

66
65
60
28
20

3
0
0
2
0

63
65
60
26
20

66
65
60
28
20

$338
$308
$418
$726
Total
Source: Komanoff & Ketcham, supra note 3. Accident costs reflect 46,300
fatalities, including 7,400 to non-motorists (pedestrians and bicyclists), and
3,620,000 injuries of varying severity, including 204,000 to non-motorists; costs
shown are net of insurance awards. Congestion externalities include lost time
and amenity of pedestrians, cyclists and transit users. Air pollution reflects
values of human lives lost, time and amenity lost to illness, and ecosystem
damage. See infranote 16. Land reflects half of space occupied by roadways, on
premise that roads' common carrier function requires only half of actual road
space. Energy-related costs are for military forces to guarantee United States
hegemony over foreign oil, and global warming costs from gasline's CO 2
emissions. Noise cost extrapolates from estimated effect of highway noise on
propeity values; it also includes damage to non-roadway infrastructure caused
by vibration from heavy trucks. Not yet reflected here are: costs of petroleum
extraction, shipping, storage and refining-, air pollution's degradation of
visibility; vehicle manufacture and disposal; water pollution; and enabling of
sprawl.
TABLE 1
13. See generally, MAcKENzI ET
source, unless otherwise indicated).
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A. Accidents
Vehicle crashes in the United States in 1990 caused
losses with an estimated value of $346 billion, or $319 billion
after netting $27 billion in insurance awards to victims.14

Motorists (drivers and passengers) bore the brunt of the pain,
suffering and lost life. Employers and taxpayers have financed most of the associated health insurance and workers'
compensation, and also bore much of the cost of workplace
disruption as well as vocational rehabilitation for incapacitated workers. Non-motorists also bore the loss of life and
amenity to pedestrians and cyclists struck by motor vehicles,
which accounted for 16% of United States crash fatalities and
almost 6% of injuries in 1990.
Of the $319 billion in net costs associated with United
States motor vehicle accidents in 1990, motorists bore $270
billion, and the public at large bore $49 billion. The $49 billion in public costs represents a subsidy of drivers by the general public; increasing the price of driving by that amount
would internalize this subsidy.
B. Congestion
Stop-and-go driving costs Americans an estimated $168
billion a year. Most of this cost represents motorists' lost
time as well as higher shipping costs; but as much as 15%, or
$25 billion, falls on the public, in time lost by non-motorists
(walkers, cyclists, bus passengers) and municipal vehicles.
This $25 billion in congestion costs is an externality that
drivers impose on the public. In another sense, however, all
congestion costs are imposed by drivers on someone else, for
example, other road users. All congestion costs should, thus,
qualify as externalities, eligible for inclusion in the price of
driving via congestion pricing. As we see below, however, it is
not necessary to charge for all congestion costs in order to
15
reduce traffic jams and create considerable societal benefits.
14. Cora Roelofs & Charles Komanoff, Costs of Motor Vehicle Fatalities and
Injuries in New York City and State (Dec. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Komanoff Energy Assosciates).
15. See infra § VI A.
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C. Air and Noise Pollution
The annual cost in illness, lives cut short, crop loss and
ecosystem damage from vehicular pollution is estimated at
$66 billion.16 Noise cost includes $22 billion in stress, sleep
loss and impaired activity from direct vehicular noise (tires,
engines, brakes, horns, sirens, etc.); and $6 billion in vibration damage to buildings and underground infrastructure
such as water mains, propagated through the roadway surface, primarily from heavy trucks in older Northeastern cities
where highways are in close proximity to old structures and
conduits. Motorists probably bear around 5% of air and noise
pollution costs; the other 95% is felt by the public (including
car users when not driving).17 Still, because even motorists

are primarily affected by other vehicles' noise and fumes
rather than their own, 100% of both categories qualify as externalities, eligible for user fees.
D. Land
Roads consume land and alter landscapes, both rural and
urban. Early roads blended with the landscape; for the most
part, they were amenities used by a wide variety of travelers.
Today, roads are built on a vaster scale that intrudes onsome would say destroys-landscapes and communities, and
have been appropriated by motor vehicles for their exclusive
use.
Here, the land costs of motor vehicles are estimated as
the tax revenues foregone on half of all land used by roads;
the other 50% is assumed to provide a societal good as a common carrier for municipal vehicles and, to a limited extent,
non-motorized travel. All such costs-an estimated $65 billion a year in lost production or revenue-are assigned to the
public sector, since it represents a loss of resources that were
previously held in common by the citizenry.
16. Cora Roelofs, Costs of Vehicular Air Pollution in the United States
(1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Komanoff Energy Associates).
17. Emission control devices and less-polluting fuels already cost motorists
approximately $50 billion a year. Telephone Interview with Brian Ketcham,
Konheim & Ketcham (Feb. 1994).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/7

10

1994]

POLLUTION TAX FORUM

131

E. Energy-Related Costs
Energy-related costs refer, first, to the prospective financial impacts of global climate change from carbon dioxide generated in gasoline combustion ($25 billion annually), and,
second, to federal tax dollars expended on maintaining American military hegemony over oil exported to America to fulfill
gasoline demand ($35 billion annually). As with land, 100%
of these costs, which total $60 billion annually, are assigned
to the public at large, and are considered eligible for user
fees.
VI. Roadway User Fees18
At least seven different kinds of economic incentives are
available to offset and internalize the public costs from motor
vehicle harms enumerated here. Two mechanisms restructure expenditures on insurance and parking to enable motorists to save money by driving less. This section discusses five
means to directly charge for harms that driving creates.
Some measures could be implemented immediately.
Others would require technological development, public education and even modification of the roadway infrastructure.
All of these proposals would need to be phased in so as to
minimize economic dislocation and give drivers time to adapt.
The phase-in might be stretched over several decades, to parallel the lead time to improve and create transit alternatives
and mold land use to better fit the true costs of transport.
A. Congestion Pricing
Congestion pricing assesses vehicles for the congestion
and the time losses they impose on other roadway users. In
doing so, congestion pricing can dampen and flatten the demand to use roads, thereby reducing the aggregate loss of
drivers' time and also defraying the need to expand road capacity. Ideally, congestion charges would vary widely among
peak, shoulder (in-between) and off-peak conditions, corre18. Crr=ms ACTION PLAN (Tri-State Transportation Campaign, at Ch. 5
§ C (New York, N.Y., Dec. 1993)).
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sponding to each vehicle's responsibility in creating congestion. Commuters driving into or within city centers would
pay premium prices, while travelers commuting from urban
cores to suburban job locations would be charged considerably less, commensurate with their lower contribution to congestion. Motorists using uncongested rural roads would not
pay congestion fees.
Airlines and utilities have used congestion or peak pricing for several decades to shift discretionary demand to offpeak periods. For example, most long-distance telephone service is priced only one-third as high on weekends as during
business hours. Similarly, congestion pricing of roads would
be expected to reduce peak usage of roadways via modal
shifts to other forms of travel (e.g., train, bus, bicycle,
ridesharing) or shifts in time of travel.
The microeconomic rationale is that although drivers endure their own lost time from congestion, they are not
charged for the delay costs they create for others. The result,
as noted by economist Anthony Downs, is that individual
drivers continue to enter a roadway, even when the average
total cost of their arrival on the roadway exceeds the average
benefit of using it.19 These delay costs can be enormous. By
one estimate, a single automobile entering San Francisco's
road system during peak hours can generate a total of one
20
hour of additional delay for all other drivers combined.
How much to charge under congestion pricing would depend on the extent to which drivers would respond to the
higher price to drive. This would depend on the availability
and attractiveness of alternative modes, the value placed on
peak-period driving, and how much congestion society wishes
to eliminate. As Downs and others have pointed out, the objective is not necessarily to eliminate all congestion, but to
maximize the net benefits from society's economic resources,
including not only time but capital invested in roads. 2 1 Thus,
19. ANTHONY DowNs, BROOKIN S INSTITUTION, STUCK IN TRAFFIC-CoPING
WITH PEAK HouR TRAFIc CONGESTION 49 (1992).
20. Market-Based Solutions to the TransportationCrisis: The Concept, Bay
Area Economic Forum, at 7 (San Francisco, CA, May 1990).
21. DowNs, supra note 19, at 50.
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the appropriate level of congestion pricing is probably far less
than the $168 billion a year in congestion costs.
A comprehensive analysis of congestion covering the entire country was published by the World Resources Institute
(WRI) in 1992.22 The WRI analysis is based on estimated
traffic congestion in 1989 on five types of roads in the federal
aid system, ranging from interstates to arterials and collectors, which together account for slightly over half of all
United States vehicle miles traveled. WRI modeled a system
of congestion charges ranging as high as 21¢ per mile, but
averaging 4-50 per all miles driven on these roads, and generating $44 billion in congestion charges. WRI estimated that
this pricing regime would reduce vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) by 6%, with an 11% reduction in VMT under most con23
gested conditions.
According to WRI, this
regime would create the greatest net benefits, estimated at $4
billion per year. This is the
value of time savings to motor-

ESTIMATED CONGESTION
ToLis FOR ALL
UNITED STATES HIGHWAYS

ists on these highways, netted
by the costs of longer or

Traffic and Price Levels

Based on World Resources

Institute With

1989

rescheduled journeys for those
who choose to avoid the congestion tolls. Adjusting roughly for
higher traffic and price levels
since 1989, WRs $44 billion in

* Average per mile charges:

national congestion charges
equates to about $50 billion.

rescheduled and foregone)

•

.

*

•
*

4-5g

21g
Highest per mile charge:
Estimated VMT reduction:
6%
11%
Estd peak VMT reduction:
$44 billion
Total charges:
Benefits in time savings: $4 billion,
(net of value of trips rerouted,

The WRI report also found that higher congestion
charges could be justified by the reductions in accidents that
could be expected from reduced traffic. Thus, a conservative
total of $60 billion in congestion charges has been assumed
22. ROBERT REPETTO FT AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, GREEN FEES:
How A TAX SIFT CAN WORK FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY, 44-45
(Nov. 1992).
23. See MAcKENzIE ET AL. supra note 2.
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here, of which $50 billion is allocable to congestion reduction
and $10 billion to accident reduction.24
How much of the $60 billion in revenues should be invested in transportation improvements, and how much
should be returned to the public in lower taxes and/or other
public services, is a key question beyond the scope of this paper. A recent study in the United Kingdom found that public
support for roadway pricing rose from 30% to 57%, under the
assumption that revenues would be used to improve public
transport, cycling and walking, and to reduce accidents,
rather than being funneled into the general fund.25 However,
there is also a strong case for returning some congestion-pricing revenues to the general public, to offset the share of congestion costs that falls on the public at large.
Congestion pricing has been tried in only a handful of cities, all outside the United States. 26 Effective implementation
will require a mechanism such as automatic vehicle identification that can charge vehicles for use of roads, without toll
barriers and their attendant delays, frustration and fumes.
Indeed, replacing existing toll systems with time-saving nonstop tolls could make congestion pricing and other user fees
attractive to motorists. Minimizing traffic spillover onto parallel routes, particularly neighborhood streets where additional traffic would create danger and disruption, would be
essential. 27
A variant of congestion pricing could be implemented immediately, without any new electronic devices, to provide a
market-based means for reducing congestion causing taxi
cruising (driving in search of fares) in Manhattan and other
high-congestion areas. A mileage surcharge would be added
to all trips, to be passed along in the fare only during revenue
trips; the surcharge would be absorbed by the driver (and the
24. See MAcKENZIE ET ALi.supra note 2.
25. Anthony D. May, InternationalExperiences with Congestion Pricing,
ITE J., 14, 19 n. 34 (Dec. 1993).
26. See articles by Anthony D. May, Andrew J. Lampe, Bert Arrillaga and
A.P. Gopinath Menon in ITE J., special issue on congestion pricing, Dec. 1993.
27. Michele Herman et al., Bicycle Blueprint: A Plan to Bring Bicycling
Into the Mainstreamin New York City, TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES (Apr. 1993) at 45.
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cabbie's company) for all cruising miles. Fees would be collected when taxis are routinely inspected for pollution and
safety-every four months in New York City. A fee of 250 per
mile could generate about $250 million annually for New
York City. Customers would pay $150 million, since 60% of
taxi miles are with passengers. Drivers would absorb $100
million, or about $25 per cab per day, creating a strong incentive to wait at designated cab stands rather than cruise for
fares.
In addition, congestion pricing offers a potentially superior alternative to high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes being
constructed or proposed on dozens of American highways.
Both seek to create incentives for ridesharing. HOV lanes attempt to accomplish ridesharing by offering carpoolers time
savings through a relatively traffic-free place on the road.
Congestion pricing attempts to encourage ridesharing by offering monetary savings, since with more passengers each
pay less. Congestion pricing appears preferable from a theoretical standpoint, because it equalizes the charge paid per
car, which is the agent causing the damage.28 Moreover,
HOV lanes are expensive to administer and police. In addition, HOV lanes have proven to be stalking horses for highway expansion. Finally, congestion pricing would allow
flexible, real-time pricing varying with traffic levels over
daily and weekly cycles and with long-term changes; HOV
lanes are either in use or not, with no modulation.
B.

Smog Fees

Smog fees would charge individual motorists for the
harm caused by the emissions their vehicles dump into the
environment. Each vehicle's emissions would be estimated as
28. A.P. Gopinath Menon et al., Singapore'sRoad PricingSystem: Its Past,
Present and Future, ITE J. 44, 47 (Dec. 1993). Hopefully, congestion pricing
would put to rest recurring proposals to waive tolls for high-occupancy vehicles;
such proposals ignore the fact that a four-person vehicle creates the same congestion as a one-person vehicle, and thus merits the same congestion chargewhich the passengers may then split four ways. Singapore, site of the world's
oldest congestion pricing program (since 1972), revoked its carpool exemption in
1989. Id.

15

136

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

the product of miles driven by the vehicle and per mile pollution emission rates. Mileage would be recorded from the
odometer at the time of the emission and/or safety inspection.
Emission rates would be obtained in periodic vehicle emission
tests. 29 Dollar charges per each pound of vehicular pollution
would also be estimated, according to each pollutant's damage to health, buildings, visibility, agriculture and the natural environment. This could vary for different locales, based
on population density, ecosystem characteristics, and pollutant dispersion.
Smog fees would stand several decades of pollution regulation on their head. The original Clean Air Act and its periodic Amendments have all centered on compliance with
standards. Specifically, it is legal to pollute so long as emission rates fall within mandated thresholds. Smog fees rest on
the premises that pollution is harmful at virtually any level,
and that polluters should compensate others for the damage
they cause. Of late, these principles are being applied to corporate smokestacks and discharge pipes. Gaining acceptance
to apply them to 150 million vehicle tailpipes will be difficult
but not necessarily impossible.
A selling point of smog fees is their proportionality,
which creates an element of fairness. Clearly, cars driven
twice as far or emitting twice as much per mile do pollute
more and, as a corollary, should pay more. Moreover, fees
based on emissions could allow government to retire a battery
of complex mandates, such as California's Low Emission Vehicle program, which specifies progressively lower emission
rates for new cars 30 ; the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments'

Clean Fuel Fleet Program, mandating emission limits for
centrally-fueled vehicle fleets in high-pollution areas3 1 ; and
the Amendments' Employer Trip Reduction program, which

29. Accordingly, smog fees are sometimes referred to as pollution-distance
charges.
30. Clean Air Act (CAA) § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
31. CAA § 246, 42 U.S.C. § 7586 (West Supp. 1994).
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requires 20% reductions in automobile commuting at large
32
workplaces in badly polluted metropolitan areas.
Instead, each city or region would charge motorists for
their vehicles' pollutants. This incentive should induce motorists to reduce emissions in various ways: by driving less;
by trading up to less-polluting vehicles; among multiple-car
owners, by shifting usage from higher-polluting to lower-polluting vehicles; and by improving maintenance of vehicle
emission control systems.
Unfortunately, tests to accurately quantify vehicle emissions are relatively expensive. Because emissions vary depending on factors such as engine temperature and how
recently the vehicle was serviced, an emissions fee could lead
to frequent disagreements and claims for adjustments. However, an ingenious variant of emissions-based charges proposed by Professor William Vickrey could ease this problem
33
by making the emission measurements voluntary.
Each vehicle would be assigned a nominal pollution rating. Manufacturers' test ratings, certified by the federal Environmental Protection Agency, would be used for brand-new
vehicles. As vehicles age, these rates would be adjusted to
reflect degradation over time at a near worst-case rate, again
based on test data for each vehicle make, model and year of
manufacture. Motorists would pay according to this rating,
which is analogous to the blue book valuations of car resale
value, although the deterioration in per-mile emissions would
need to be calibrated to both age and miles driven-not a
simple matter.
However, motorists willing to invest in emission tuneups could optionally base their pollution fee on emissions
measured at licensed test centers. That is, motorists would
be given an opportunity to beat the blue book rating by tun32. The Employer Trip Reduction program mandates 25% increases in pervehicle occupancy, which are mathematically equivalent to 20% reductions in
vehicle use. CAA § 182 (d)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
33. William Vickrey, Making New York City Work (May 5, 1992) (unpublished typescript, on file with Dep't of Economics at Columbia Univ.). To implement Vickrey's proposal, inspection and maintenance schemes might have to be
modified to better reflect real-world driving cycles and actual emissions.
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ing up their vehicle and having the emission rate measured
after the tune up. Drivers would then have a strong incentive
to put their emission control systems in good working order.
If this system succeeded, smog fees could eventually become
an alternative to mandated state inspection and maintenance
(I&M) programs.
Per-pound levels of revenue for each pollutant would be
based on estimated damage to human health and the environment. Nationwide revenues generated from smog fees
should equal the total damage, less the small share of health
costs that motorists bear by inhaling exhaust while they are
driving so that motorists do not pay twice.
Vickrey's proposal, though attractive, does not solve all
problems with smog fees. For one thing, emissions can range
considerably per mile driven by a single car, varying not only
with driver behavior and differences in gasoline quality, but
also with trip distance. Since present-day catalytic converters are ineffective at cold engine temperatures, a series of
short trips tend to be much more polluting than a single trip
covering the same total distance. Safeguards would be
needed to prevent tampering with emissions measurements
and odometers, although eventually it should be possible to
record both parameters automatically through real-time electronic monitoring. Because some pollutants are carried in
the atmosphere over long distances, particularly ozone and
nitrogen oxides, as acid rain, revenues from smog fees should
be transferred from the point of generation to the point of
harm, which is difficult to establish both scientifically and
politically.
Even though smog fees are imperfect, they have strong
advantages over current regulatory schemes to reduce vehicular emissions. Like congestion pricing, smog fees need not
be implemented nationally, but could be put in place on a
metropolitan or regional basis, particularly since they would
be essentially revenue-neutral across the district where they
apply. Moreover, given concern over pollution-related disease, if the public does perceive smog fees as reasonable and
fair, it might be possible to implement them relatively
quickly, with a shorter phase-in period than for some other
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roadway user fees discussed here. A portion of the revenues
generated by smog fees could be applied to improve transit
end other alternatives to cars and trucks. Perhaps transit
providers could borrow against anticipated smog fee revenues, allowing them to begin initiating service improvements
so that alternative transportation is in place before or during
the ramp-up to the full smog fees.34 Global climate effects of
carbon dioxide are discussed further below, as are equity considerations from smog fees.3 5
C. Weight-Distance Charges
Weight-distance, or ton-mile charges, would operate parallel to smog fees, or pollution-distance charges. Just as
smog fees would be calculated as per-mile emissions times
miles driven, weight-distance charges would reflect vehicle
weight times miles driven. Weight-distance charges would
capture, and thus offset, at least five distinct forms of societal
harm from motor vehicles (parentheses denote annual United
States costs deemed eligible for user fees):
1. Vibration Damage to (Non-Roadway) Infrastructure
($6 Billion)
Heavy vehicles shake buildings, water mains and other
infrastructure in older urban centers. Because damage rises
exponentially with weight-one heavy truck causes far more
damage than a fleet of light vehicles with the same total
weight-this cost might best be captured by user fees allocated only on vehicles exceeding a specified weight per axle.
With that caveat, all $6 billion in infrastructure damage costs
could be captured through weight-distance charges.
2. Noise and Intrusiveness ($22 Billion)
Weight times distance provides a reasonable approximation of vehicle noise and physical intrusiveness. The bigger
34. Letter from Charles Komanoff to Richard McClintock, Executive Director, The Colorado Public Interest Research Group (Feb. 7, 1994) (on file with
Komanoff Energy Assoc.).
35. See infra § VI D.
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the vehicle and the more it is driven, the more noise it generates through engine operation, gear-shifting, tire noise on
pavement, etc., and the more other people on the road or in
the community will hear it and have to adjust to its presence.
Slightly more than half of this cost to the public, $12 billion
annually, is reasonably estimated to be a direct function of
vehicle weight and distance traveled. Other sources of vehicle noise such as horn-honking, burglar alarms, and some engine adjustment (e.g., by motorcyclists), are assumed to be a
function of operator behavior and not vehicle weight; these
damages, $10 billion per year, would be captured through
fines and fees.3 6
3. Land ($65 Billion)
Vehicle demand for road space and, hence, land, is directly proportional to miles traveled and closely proportional
to vehicle weight. 37 Weight times distance is thus an excellent proxy for vehicle use of land and the corresponding
harms to society and the environment from that usage, suggesting that $60 billion in land costs should be captured
through weight-distance charges. The remaining $5 billion is
assumed to be attributable to vehicles parked on public land
and streets; this could be offset through fees and fines.38
4. Accidents ($49 Billion)
A vehicle's annual weight times distance reflects its
physical presence on the road, and thus serves as an indicator of its propensity to cause serious accidents. Actual corre36. Intriguing theoretical ideas abound for metering and charging for such
harms without the direct regulatory intervention of fees and fines. One is a
decibel charge for making motorists pay for the public annoyance of horn-honking; car and truck horns would be designed to require recharging via decibelhour refill packs, costing so many dollars for so many seconds or minutes of
honking at a given volume. Price would vary with population density where
sold, to reflect the average number of people exposed to the noise. Since almost
all horn use is venting of frustration, decibel charges need not discourage drivers from safety-related honking. An analogous scheme could be developed for
recharging car burglar alarms.
37. The author has estimated that vehicle footprint-surface area-is approximately proportional to the 5/6 power of vehicle weight.
38. See infra § VI E.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/7

20

1994]

POLLUTION TAX FORUM

spondence to actual accidents is admittedly rough, since
driver behavior is not reflected, but there is at least a weak
correlation nevertheless. Of $49 billion annually in externalities borne by non-motorists, one-fifth, or $10 billion, is assumed to relate directly to vehicle weight and mileage,
independently of driver behavior.
5. Taxpayer Subsidies ($20 Billion)
As noted earlier, United States taxpayers pay $20 to $30
billion in general taxes, primarily at the local level, to make
up for the shortfall of roadway user fees against governmental expenditures on roads.39 These expenditures include re40
pairs, much of which is necessitated by heavy vehicle loads,

new construction and associated maintenance. As a first approximation, the entire cost of $20 billion (the lower end of
the range) is assigned to weight-distance charges, based on
the connections between weight and distances, and the need
41
to repair and build roads.
Weight-distance charges would not be entirely new. Passenger vehicles (cars and light trucks) today pay lower annual registration fees than commercial vehicles (trucks), with
fees generally varying by weight within classes. 42 Several
states also levy weight-distance charges on trucks. However,
the charges are often small-far below the variation in societal harm-and the mechanisms primitive. Weight-distance
charges in New York State for forty-ton trucks are under 4¢
per mile, yet these heaviest trucks cause an estimated $2 of
infrastructure damage alone per mile driven in the New York
39. See supra § IV B.
40. Heavy vehicles wear out pavement much faster than do light vehicles.
The rule of thumb in highway engineering is that damage and stress to roadways is proportional to the 4th power of vehicle weight per axle.
41. From a theoretical standpoint, road work should be financed out of
weight-distance charges, and gasoline taxes should be reallocated to defray
damage directly associated with petroleum; see infra § VI D.
42. In Washington State, for example, weight-based differentials in annual
registration fees vary by as much as $1,000. Jim Lazar, personal communication, Jan. 7, 1994.
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area.4 3 Moreover, truck weight-distance charges are gener-

ally estimated by an honor system, with truckers themselves
filing the forms specifying weight hauled and miles driven.
What is needed is a more automatic system that will allow higher per-ton-mile rates to be levied fairly and accurately. One possible approach would use the automatic
vehicle identification (AVI) technology envisioned for congestion charges." AVI could also undergird a network of weightin-motion stations to identify and weigh trucks while they are
driven past a bank of sensors. This is not high-tech dreaming; alone among the fifty states, Oregon already measures
truck weight at nearly seventy stations where trucks cross a
weighing pad at speed. The next logical step is for Oregon,
and other states, to bill trucks electronically using AVI technology. Passenger vehicles could be exempted initially, and
would pay far lower amounts in any event due to their lesser
weights.
The discussion in this section suggests that $108 billion a
year could be raised nationwide through weight-distance
charges to compensate the public for vehicle harms. The
same estimation factors that were used to derive these estimates, largely matrices of per-mile costs for different vehicle
types on different roadway types, would be applied locally
and regionally to develop weight-distance charges appropriate to different land uses and population densities.
D.

Gasoline Taxes

Taxes on motor fuels-gasoline and diesel fuel-are the
prime means used by industrial countries to offset societal
harms from driving. Taxes on motor fuel average $1.75 per
gallon in Japan, $3.75 in Italy, and within that range in Germany, France and Britain. Gasoline taxes are far less in the
United States, where combined federal and state levies average only 34¢ per gallon in the New York, New Jersey and
43. Komanoff & Ketcham, supra note 3 (1992 calculation by Brian
Ketcham). New York State charge under 4¢ per mile, from New York State
Department of Taxation and Finance, Form MT-903 (Combined Truck Mileage
and Fuel Use Tax Return) (June 1990).

44. See generally § VI A.
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Connecticut tri-state region, for example, 45 and these revenues are used almost wholly to pay for roads rather than to
offset societal harms.4 6 Still, they dwarf any other roadway
use charges collected by government, except for bridge and
road tolls in several heavily urbanized areas.
Raising taxes on motor fuel is attractive to policy-makers. The collection mechanism is already in place, and the
system rewards fuel efficiency, a social good, since gasoline
47
purchases decline with higher vehicle energy efficiency.
Gasoline taxes are an appropriate tool for offsetting the
harms directly associated with vehicular use of petroleum.
Those harms include refinery and groundwater pollution, the
drilling's destruction of homeland and habitat, and American
military expenditures to guarantee oil supplies. Gasoline
taxes should also include a carbon tax component to capture
driving's contribution to global warming, since vehicular CO 2
emissions are a direct function of the amount of gasoline
48
burned.
Conversely, gasoline consumption correlates weakly to

other important categories of motor vehicle harms, such as
congestion, air pollution and accidents. As suggested earlier,
congestion pricing, smog fees, and weight-distance taxes capture these impacts more explicitly. 49 For example, a forty-ton
tractor-trailer uses only three to four times the fuel of a one
or two ton car while wreaking literally thousands of times as
45. In December 1993, the federal gasoline tax stood at 18.40; state taxes
were 10.50 in New Jersey, 15.60 in New York, and 20.00 in Connecticut.
46. As noted earlier, motorist user fees-gas taxes, tickets, fees and finespay for some but not all road building and maintenance costs. For the entire
United States, the gap, made up by general taxes, appears to be between $20
and $30 billion, even allowing for the exceptions.
47. Declining gasoline consumption due to higher automotive fuel efficiency
helped swell the gap between governmental revenues from, and expenditures
on, motor vehicle use in the early 1980's. See State of New York, Legislative
Commission on the Modernization and Simplification of Tax Administration
and the Tax Law, TransportationTaxes in New York State, May 17, 1983 (preliminary analysis, attributed to Prof. Kenneth Small, Princeton University).
48. Smog emissions depend far more on the design and condition of the
emission control system.
49. See supra § VI A-C.
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much damage to roadways. 50 Thus, weight-distance charges
geared to axle weight appear to be a more precise means of
offsetting vehicle damage to roadways, than are gasoline
taxes.
Thus, gasoline taxes should be only one element in an
array of roadway user fees, rather than the centerpiece as is
often proposed. Perhaps policy-makers' frequent espousal of
gasoline taxes to offset motor vehicle harms reflects a tendency to regard excessive auto and truck use as an energy
problem centered on petroleum availability, rather than a
transportation problem that affects society in a myriad of
ways. Then again, the preference for a gasoline tax may reflect the pragmatic consideration that raising gasoline taxes
requires neither technical nor institutional change.
Energy-related costs are shown in Table I to be $60 billion a year, comprising $35 billion for military forces to safeguard foreign oil, and $25 billion in global warming costs
from motor fuel C02 emissions. These entire costs are borne
by the general public through taxes and climate degradation.
The figure does not include impacts from drilling, refining
and other upstream parts of the petroleum fuel cycle-serious harms that urgently require study.
At the 1990 rate of gasoline usage in the United States,
7.2 million barrels per day, the $60 billion to be raised in gasoline taxes to offset petroleum's social and environmental
harms is roughly 550 per gallon. This figure is in addition to
the current average United States gasoline tax of 30-35¢ per
gallon, since that revenue is already dedicated to pay part of
government's cost to build and maintain roads. As Table 2
shows, even a 550 per gallon increase in gasoline taxes would
account for only a modest percentage of the full set of revenue
measures proposed here to offset roadway harms.
Gasoline taxes below the federal level may create boundary problems, as motorists chase after cheaper gasoline in the
first untaxed county or state. This may limit the amount of
gas taxes that can be assessed locally or regionally.
50. See supra note 40.
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Fees and Fines

The foregoing four mechanisms leave uncaptured
roughly $44 billion in annual motor vehicle harms to the general public-$29 billion in accidents, 51 an estimated $10 billion in nuisance noise costs, such as horns or alarms, that
cannot be captured from a generic formula such as weightdistance charges, and $5 billion in land occupied by parked
vehicles.
All three sets of harms derive largely from driver behavior-imprudent driving putting other road users at risk, intentionally loud vehicle operation, and inappropriate
parking. Fees and fines are a logical tool to offset and discourage such conduct. Fines would be levied for abusive horn
honking, unnecessarily disruptive burglar alarms, illegal
parking, and, especially, speeding and other aggressive driving behavior that endangers other road users. Fees for onstreet parking should be increased to reflect space taken up
by vehicles.
52
Averaged across America's 170 billion licensed drivers,
$44 billion a year in fines for illegal, harmful driving would
work out to approximately $260 per driver per year.
Although data are not readily available, this is probably 5-10
times what the average driver now pays for moving and parking violations.53 Accordingly, fines of this magnitude would
almost certainly stir up strong resistance, although a phasein might help, as presumably it would with the other mechanisms discussed here.
51. This is assuming that $10 billion in accident costs would be offset
through congestion tolls, and an equal amount in -weight-distance charges.
52. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts
1992, tbl. 2, lists 167.0 minion licensed drivers in 1990 and 171.5 million in
1992.
53. In New York City, motorists pay $372 million annually in parking and
moving violations, or on the order of $200 per licensed driver. Source: $327
million in parking fines in FY 1991-92 and $45 million in moving violations in
FY 1990-91, including surcharges, from Roelofs and Komanoff, see supra note
11; number of licensed drivers is assumed to be roughly 2 million. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that annual per-driver fines in New York City are probably
three to five times the national average.
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F. Roadway User Fees-Summary
Table 2 summarizes the discussion to date. The rightmost column summarizes the estimated harms deemed ripe
for user fees in Table 1. The columns preceding it divide
these amounts into components that would be collected
through the five roadway pricing mechanisms just discussed.
PROPOSED ROADWAY USER FEES - SUMMARY

1990 ANNuAL FiGURES

FOR THE UNITED STATES IN BILLIONS
WEIGHT-

VEMCLE HARM
Congestion
Air Pollution
Land
Energy
Noise
Tax Subsidy

Share, Total

SMOG

DISTANCE

PMCING

FEES

CHARGEs

FEES AND

GAS TAXES

$10

$10

Accidents

[TOTAL

CONGESTION

Fnixs

TOTAL

$29

$49

$50

1

$50

$66

$66
$5

$60
$60

$10

$18
$20
1

$60

I

1

I

$66

I

$108

20%I 32%

$65
$60$28

$20

[

[

$60

1 $44

18% I

1 $338

13%1 100%

Most figures are derived in text. Percents do not add to 100 due to rounding.
Total fees are roughly half of total motor vehicle harms (see text).

TABLE 2

Revenues from the roadway user fees proposed here for
the United States total $338 billion per year. The largest fee
mechanism, weight-distance charges, account for less than a
third of total revenue; the smallest mechanism is fees and
fines, at 13%. In between are smog fees, (increased) gas taxes
and congestion pricing, each of which constitutes 18-20% of
the total.
Thus, congestion pricing, often touted as the centerpiece
of roadway user fees, would account for only about one-fifth of
the total. 54 Gasoline taxes too would be relegated to a somewhat secondary role; even counting the $35 billion now collected in gasoline taxes from United States motorists, total
54. The relatively small share of overall roadway user fees assigned to congestion pricing should be kept in mind by those who sometimes use the two
terms interchangeably.
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gas taxes with the program outlined here would be slightly
less than weight-distance charges. The sleepers in this analysis are weight-distance charges and smog fees. Although
most discussions of roadway pricing accord them little attention, together they would account for around half (52%) of total user fee revenues.
These share levels are highly theoretical and also are aggregated for the country as a whole. In practice, each city or
region should choose its own revenue levels, reserving for itself decisions as to which vehicle harms are the most serious
and, accordingly, which mechanisms should play the greatest
roles.
The measures discussed here are not competing but complementary, even synergistic; they should be pursued simultaneously. If political or other considerations preclude
adopting any one measure, the others should be correspondingly increased. As noted in this section, all of the measures
should be phased in to allow institutions to expand transportation choices and to cushion the hardships that rapid price
changes invariably create.
VII. Measures to Meter Different Parts of the Cost of
Driving
The preceding section discussed five roadway pricing
measures to be levied on the harms from driving-congestion
pricing, smog fees, weight-distance charges, gasoline taxes,
and fines. This section considers two different but related
types of economic incentives which meter or unbundle motorist costs: cashing-out free parking and pay-at-the-pump
insurance.
Measures to unbundle parking and insurance differ from
roadway user fees. Rather than imposing new charges, they
change the terms of payment through metering schemes that
vary with the amount of driving. Unlike the roadway pricing
measures above, unbundling is not a way to make motorists
pay more, but a device to restructure motorist payments to
make the costs of driving more transparent and equitable.
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A. Cashing-Out Free Parking
United States motorists pay large sums to park at garages, lots and municipal meters. 55 But the vast majority of
parking in America is provided at office parks, shopping centers and strip malls is free. Employers offer parking as a
fringe benefit. Proprietors offer it as a courtesy.
Of course, firms make outlays to provide parking, to pay
for land, construction and maintenance. They recover these
costs by bundling parking as overhead in the price of goods.
In effect, each $20 spent at the mall includes 25¢ to cover the
share of rent that paid for the customer's parking space.
Provision of free parking is a strong inducement to travel
by car, more powerful in many circumstances than if motorists were offered free gasoline. 56 Forced to choose between
free parking and nothing, car-owners are more likely to take
the parking and drive to work or shop-the fringe benefit becomes free commuting rather than free parking. In several
instances in which workplace parking charges have been unbundled-paid for separately-driver-only traveling has declined by an average of 25-30%.5 These drivers elect to avoid
the parking fee and switch to carpooling, transit, walking or
biking.
These considerations have given rise to proposals to
charge employees for parking, and to return the revenues to
all employees on an equal per capita basis. California law
mandates cashing out in certain circumstances, and it is part
of the Clinton Administration's Climate Change Action
Plan.58 Both initiatives apply only to employers; once they
55. Perhaps surprisingly, no estimate is available of the annual value of
parking transactions in the United States. The Eno Foundation's annual
Transportationin America, which charts expenditures on United States ground
transportation, bundles parking costs with auto repair, maintenance and
rental.
56. Donald C. Shoup and Richard W. Willson, Employer PaidParking: The
Problem and Proposed Solutions Vol. 46, No. 2 TxNsP. Q. (ENO Transp.
Found., Inc., Westport, Conn.) at 170.
57. Id. at tbl. 1.
58. Donald C. Shoup, U.S. DFP'T OF T&Asp., CASHING OuT EMPLOYER PAID
PARKONG 141 (Dec. 1992). In October 1993 President Clinton directed his Administration to prepare legislation giving workers the option of receiving the
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have penetrated the workplace, they could be extended to
shopping malls and other large establishments.
For example, consider an office park with 1,000 workers,
700 of whom drive and park for free (the remainder use
transit, ride-share, walk, cycle, etc.). Under cashing out, each
car would be charged the actual cost of providing its parking
space (corresponding to land, maintenance, etc.), say $5 per
day. Each day's parking revenue, $3,500 in this case, would
be distributed per capita-a daily payment of $3.50 to every
worker-drivers and non-drivers.
As a result, non-drivers come out $3.50 ahead; drivers
are $1.50 behind ($3.50 less $5.00); the group as a whole
breaks even. The $5 daily difference between driving and
non-driving creates a strong incentive not to drive. As some
drivers find other ways to get to work, the result will be less
congested parking lots, roads, bridges, atmosphere, etc. Nondrivers, for their part, get a better deal than their present
choice between a free parking space or nothing.
As the number of drivers declines, the parking area freed
up could be sold or put to alternative use.5 9 The charges and
rebates would have to be adjusted over time, to ensure that
the arrangement remains revenue-neutral. As the percentage of drivers goes down, the rebate would decline. Eventually a balance would be reached. Although managing the
charges and rebates would cost money, electronic vehicle
identification systems could hold down costs.
B. Pay-At-The-Pump Insurance
A proposal attracting attention in California and elsewhere would link automobile insurance with purchases of
gasoline by including an insurance component in the gas
price. Under pay-at-the-pump insurance, drivers would
purchase sufficient premium with each refill of gasoline to
cash value of employer-paid parking. President William Clinton, Earth Day
Address (Apr. 22, 1993).
59. In many jurisdictions, zoning ordinances would need to be changed to
enable office parks, shopping centers and other establishments to reduce parking capacity. Doing so would help establish a true opportunity cost for land now
mandated for parking.
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cover the actuarial risk associated with driving the distance
that a typical car can travel on a gallon of gas. To reflect differences in actuarial risk between different drivers and different vehicles (e.g., urban vs. rural), high-risk vehicles would
pay a surcharge at registration, fines for moving violations
would be raised, and drivers in high-risk age groups might
60
pay more for licenses.
Proponents of pay-at-the-pump insurance make a convincing case for its potential to cut costs for drivers and society as a whole. Some insurance sales and underwriting costs
would be eliminated, shopping and paying for insurance
would be simplified, and all motorists would automatically
carry insurance. Moreover, because the probability of being
in an accident rises with miles driven, premiums would be
aligned more closely with risk than under the present lumpsum system for purchasing insurance. Most importantly
from the perspective of this paper, blending some of the cost
of insurance into the price of gasoline would create a strong
incentive to economize on driving, and thus reduce the at61
tendant harms of congestion, pollution and traffic accidents.
For example, consider a typical car with a $600 insurance premium, which is driven 12,000 miles a year. Assuming that the car averages 20 miles per gallon of gas, it
requires 600 gallons of gas a year. Dividing the annual insurance premium by gallons of gas consumed, the car in effect
absorbs $1 in insurance per gallon of gasoline.
Under pay-at-the-pump, insurance would be purchased
with each gallon of gas. After a gradual phase-in, the level
might be set at, say, 500 or 60o per gallon, constituting a big
inducement to drive less. The monies would be collected by
state government (along with the gas taxes it already collects) and divided among insurers in proportion to their cov60. Andrew Tobias, Auto InsuranceAlert (Simon & Schuster 1993) is a popular treatment of this idea and the basis of the presentation in the text. See
also, To 'Fill'Er Up'May Soon Mean With Premiums,WAU. ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993,
at B1.
61. Motorists would also have great incentive to use more fuel-efficient cars,
thus abating the various costs associated with petroleum extraction and
processing. See supra § VI D.
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erage. Insurers would be selected randomly through a staterun pool. Some premiums might still be paid in a lump-sum
by drivers, but these would be reduced to reflect all drivers'
purchases of insurance at the pump. Total insurance payments would not increase. In fact, they would drop because
of savings in paperwork and elimination of uninsured motorists. Just the method of payment would change.
Border issues, including inequities for drivers from
neighboring states and incentives to hunt for cheaper gas,
may impede implementation of pay-at-the-pump insurance
on a state or even a regional basis. Federal action may be
preferable. As an alternative to pay-at-the-pump, auto insurance might be levied on the basis of vehicle miles traveled.
C. Another Mechanism: Drive Plus
Another mechanism intended to reduce the harmful impacts of driving is directed at car-owners' vehicle purchases.
Under the Drive+ program, purchasers of new cars and
trucks would be charged a fee or given a rebate based on
whether the vehicle is more or less polluting and energy-efficient than the average new car. 6 2 Like cashing-out free park-

ing and pay-at-the-pump insurance, Drive+ would be
revenue-neutral. Specifically, the fees would cover the rebates and administrative costs. Drive+ might also be structured with incentives to retire or scrap the dirtiest vehicles
already on the road.
Drive+ has been put forward by environmental groups
who are primarily concerned with air pollution and other energy-related harms from motor vehicles, rather than with the
less explicitly environmental harms of congestion, accidents
and damage to community. Indeed, concerns have been
raised that Drive+ might induce additional automobile
purchases-and use-by making some vehicles less expensive to purchase. Moreover, it is not clear how Drive+ would
62. Drive+ is an acronym for Demand-based Reductions In Vehicle Emissions Plus Increased Fuel Economy. See Nathaniel Greene, Getting the Sticker
PriceRight: Incentives for Cleaner,More Efficient Vehicles, 12.1 PACE ENVTL. L.
REv. (Fall 1994).
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interact with existing cafe standards for fleet average fuel efficiency. Administering the fee/rebate program could generate considerable work for government, particularly if a
component is included for accelerated scrappage. Drive+
could also compete with smog fees and gasoline taxes, which
create direct incentives to drive less and curb emissions and
fuel use by charging motorists for their vehicles' pollution
and energy usage.
Nevertheless, Drive+ could be implemented today. No
new technology or infrastructure is required, and political
barriers are almost certainly lower than for increased gasoline taxes or even smog fees. Conceivably, a Drive+ program
could be crafted as a transition step to full-fledged smog and
other fees geared directly to the harms from driving.
VIII. Benefits from Roadway Pricing
This article proposes an unprecedented overhaul of the
way motorists pay for driving, through charging for the
harms caused by driving and unbundling a large share of insurance and parking costs. At issue are hundreds of billions
of dollars in potential annual roadway user fees, and rearranging the way drivers pay $50-100 billion a year in insurance and parking. Combined, these payments constitute 510% of United States GDP. Even assuming the fees are
phased in over many years, altering or creating new payment
streams of this magnitude is an enormous enterprise.
It may help to bear in mind that the problems that these
measures would address-congestion, pollution, car crashes,
sprawl, urban disinvestment, and global military and climate
disruption-are themselves enormous. Measures that can
address them effectively by creating powerful economic incentives to reduce motor vehicle harms will spin off tremendous
benefits.
Changing how motorists pay for parking and insurance,
from a lump-sum to a metered approach, will save drivers
large amounts of money by eliminating huge built-in costs.
Congestion pricing will cut down on dispiriting traffic tie-ups.
Smog fees will help clean the air. Weight-distance taxes will
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help rail freight compete with heavy trucks. Gasoline taxes
will shift motorists and auto manufacturers alike toward less
inefficient vehicles, easing pressure to drill for oil in fragile
areas and to feed military spending. Heavier fines for antisocial driving will make streets safer. In combination, the
measures will work to reduce vehicle miles traveled and improve the economics of center-oriented development vis-a-vis
continued suburban sprawl.
Moreover, the revenues raised through roadway user
fees are not dollars thrown down the drain but monies that
society can and must allocate to effect a range of transportation and other social benefits. Essentially all of the revenues
from the user fees would be available to improve transit, redress the harms from driving, and tackle other social and economic problems in American society. A summary of
principles follows, in lieu of a full discussion of revenue
treatment:
Some revenue should be invested to improve alternatives
such as transit, particularly in areas where alternatives to
driving are poorly developed, and to create dedicated repair
and maintenance funding to make auto use safer and more
efficient.
To address inequities created by the increased cost, some
revenue should be returned directly to the citizenry in tax
savings, particularly by cutting sales and other regressive
taxes.
Some revenue should be directed at repairing the damages associated with vehicle harms, i.e., by investing in communities blighted by expressways, providing health services
for people with asthma or disabilities and other victims of
pollution and crashes, soundproofing schools and other structures against highway noise, etc.
Revenue might also be allocated to fund vital social
services.
IX. Equity and Other Concerns
The pricing measures discussed here would come at a
price. Smog fees could hurt poor families that rely on old,
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polluting automobiles. Congestion pricing in effect gives
wealthier motorists more room on the highway by tolling
road use beyond the means of other drivers. Weight-distance
charges could add to the cost of goods movement. Unbundling free parking would create another service to pay for.
These objections merit close attention and further study in
some cases, although answers are available to some of them.
Again, the present inefficiencies and inequities from rampant
motor vehicle harms should be borne in mind.
A. Inequity for Poor People
America's motor vehicle dependence disproportionately
harms poor people. Low-income groups are less likely to own
and use automobiles. As a result, they receive fewer benefits
from motor vehicles and, more than other income groups, are
forced to rely on alternatives such as transit, cycling and
walking that have grown more dangerous and difficult as
more societal resources have been devoted to cars and expressways. Poor and low-income people are also more likely
to be on the receiving end of motor vehicle harms. More than
other groups, they are victims of pedestrian deaths (especially to children); are asthma sufferers vulnerable to air pollution and lacking access to health care; and live next to
noisome highways.
Thus, poor and low-income groups stand to benefit from
roadway pricing measures that reduce motor vehicle use and
harms. Moreover, they would also benefit from social investment of user fee revenues in transit and other public services.
In addition, because poor people do proportionately less suburb-to-downtown commuting, they would avoid the steepest
congestion pricing fees.
At the same time, the poor have little or no cushion for
absorbing roadway user fees, or higher living costs from any
source. They are more likely to own and operate older and
under-maintained vehicles that would be subject to heavy
smog fees. Thus, while low-income people as a group might
be made better off, roadway fees will certainly make some
people within that group worse off, particularly those who
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drive more than average. 63 Moreover, the idea of auctioning
off public roadways to the highest bidders (i.e., wealthy drivers) is an anathema to many, notwithstanding the progressive uses to which public revenues from this auction could be
put.
Research on these impacts is needed to precisely pinpoint
the impact of roadway pricing on low-income groups as a
whole and on vulnerable subgroups. Still, one measure that
would clearly benefit low-income groups would be to allocate
a significant share of roadway user revenues to reduce regressive taxes, i.e., to reduce income tax rates in lower brackets and cut sales taxes.
B. Inequity for Women
Only recently has transportation research begun to examine the particular circumstances of women. A recent
study of Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona, found that at least as
many women as men are solo drivers, and that women's commuting trips take longer, despite shorter commute distances,
perhaps because of a greater number of linked trips involving
daycare and eldercare. 64 Nationally, women work harder,
earn less money, do more uncompensated work, have fewer
employment options, and are more threatened by violence
than men, as one commentator notes. 65
These realities dictate that both roadway pricing and
travel demand management policies such as Employer Trip
Reduction programs include services to enable women to reduce solo and peak-period driving, without sacrificing time or
63. The rural poor who drive long distances in old, higher-polluting cars
would be particularly vulnerable, although per-pound smog fees would be lower
outside high-density metropolitan areas. Poor rural drivers would also be virtually unaffected by congestion pricing. Probably the most damaging roadway
user fee for rural poor people is the gasoline tax, which accounts for a far
smaller share of total user fees proposed in this paper than in most policy
proposals.
64. SANDRA RoSENLOOM & ELIZABETH BURNS, DRACHmAN INsTrrUTE FOR
LAND AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIEs, Do ENvmoNMENTAL MEIASUREs
AND TRAVEL REDUCTION PROGRAMS HuRT WORKING WOMEN? (1993).
65. Cora Roelofs, Review of Rosenbloom and Burns, AuTo-FEE PRESS,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 15.
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personal safety. Such measures include flexible work schedules, worksite childcare, guaranteed ride home programs,
and a spectrum of improvements to transit to make it safer,
more convenient and affordable, and more accessible to children and seniors, many of which could be financed with revenue generated from roadway user fees.
C. Urban Areas
Not only congestion pricing, but weight-distance charges
and smog fees, would make urban driving more expensive per
mile. 6 6 This should not disadvantage cities, however, be-

cause much of the revenue could be levied, collected and respent locally. The dollars collected from congestion pricing,
could be recycled directly as lower local taxes. In this way,
taxes on harms (congestion) would displace taxes on goods
(general economic activity).
Moreover, despite higher per-mile driving costs, city
transportation and, even more important, access to goods,
services and destinations need not become significantly more
costly. Worldwide comparative studies by Newman and Kenworthy have documented that miles driven per capita fall
precipitously as population density rises, because cars are
less practical, destinations are closer, and alternatives
(transit, walking, cycling) function better. 67 Thus, while diehard city motorists may protest roadway pricing, the likelihood is that the urban populace as a whole will benefit from
the reduction in vehicle use and the newly found revenue.
For example, urban bus service, in a downward spiral almost everywhere due to congestion, among other factors,
would tend to improve as traffic diminished. This would
make congestion pricing more palatable. Moreover, as households and businesses reduce their expenditures on vehicles
and petroleum, more income can go to local goods and services, thus helping recircuit local economies.
66. Charges for urban driving would be higher due to the fact that more
people are exposed to pollution and other vehicle disamenities than with rural
driving.
67. Peter Newman and Jeff Kenworthy, Cities and Automobile Dependence:
An InternationalSourcebook, (Gower Technical, Brookfield, Vt. 1989).
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Goods Movement

Trucks constitute 14% of United States vehicle miles
traveled, 68 but they account for disproportionately more air
pollution, infrastructure wear and tear and road congestion,
especially on many local streets and urban expressways.
Thus, the trucks' share of total roadway user fees would be
considerably higher than 14%. While this raises the likelihood of higher costs for truck shipments, the revenues would
concomitantly decrease the funds government must draw
from general revenues to repair and maintain the highway
and bridge network.
Moreover, user fees would lead truckers to reduce permile harms and would encourage shippers to find economies
by switching to rail freight, consolidating loads, deploying
smaller vehicles in congested areas, and using nearby suppliers. Analogous substitutions improved fuel efficiency in most
sectors of industrial economies in the 1970's and 1980's.
E. User Fee Administration
Most roadway pricing measures would entail new or expanded administrative functions. An obvious expense would
be the network of sensors on highways and major arterials to
record vehicle movement in order to assess congestion and
weight-distance charges. Smog fees would require mechanisms for estimation and payment. Increasing fines for violations would require additional police and adjudicatory
personnel. Cashing out parking would add monetary exchanges to an activity that is now largely offered free. Even
raising gasoline taxes could require efforts to prevent bootlegging. Indeed, strictures to guard against tampering and evasion of all roadway user fees would need to be developed and
enforced. Finally, decisions on setting levels for these
68. Calculation by Brian Ketcham, from 1989 FHWA data apportioning national VMT among 13 vehicle classes-autos, motorcycles, buses and ten
classes of trucks. Ketcham combines VMT for all truck classes (8.7%) and 30%
of 2A4T (2-axle, 4-wheel trucks, 18.1%), yielding 14.1%. The figure is intended
to exclude light trucks used for personal travel.
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charges would require not only elaborate technical analysis,
but vigorous public debate.
This is a tall order, as befits a program that would create
or re-order revenue streams amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars yearly. However, the effort could be vastly
aided by electronic and other information processing technology. Smart cards or other devices alluded to earlier would
allow automatic metering and billing, not only of driving but
69
of parking.
Even more importantly, the pricing mechanisms proposed here could reduce or completely replace a myriad of existing or planned administrative structures for pricing
vehicle use and controlling vehicle harms, such as:
(i) Toll Plazas (replaced by automatic vehicle identification, or AVI, under congestion pricing and weight-distance
charges);
(ii) HOV lanes (replaced by congestion pricing);
(iii) Mandatory Inspection and Maintenance (I&M) programs (made optional under smog fees);
(iv) Employee Commute Option programs (made moot by
smog fees, congestion pricing and cashing-out parking);
(v) Odd-even license plate days (mooted by smog and
congestion fees);
(vi) Incentives or mandates for cleaner fuels (reformulated gasoline, ethanol, etc.) and alternative-fueled vehicles
(electric, natural gas, solar, etc.) (superseded by smog fees);
(vii) Exhortations to leave the car at home during summer ozone alerts or holiday season gridlock alerts (replaced
by pre-announced increases in smog and congestion fees, administered in real time to be commensurate with predicted
pollution and congestion levels and the attendant social
costs);
(viii) Bicycle parking and shower requirements (cyclists
instead pay building managers or off-site providers for showers and safe bicycle storage, using their rebates and tax savings gained from cashing out free parking and the per capita
69. See supra § VI A.
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"VMT dividend" of lower taxes enabled by roadway user
revenues).
X. Conclusion
Thus, pricing mechanisms could help make roadway usage fairer and more efficient, without the need for potentially
cumbersome regulations. Motorists will be able to continue
making their own decisions about when, where and how to
drive, while taking responsibility to offset the costs to society
from their vehicle use. Non-motorists will receive windfalls,
their entitlement for harms they avoid imposing on society,
with which they can pay to improve their non-motorized
70
travel, or to improve other aspects of their lives.
The last example above, concerning bicycling, is intentionally provocative. The author, a bicycle commuter and activist for cyclists' rights, has long advocated for bicycle
facilities such as indoor commuter parking. 7 ' Under the current system that lavishes motorists with subsidies, special facilities for cyclists are a modest and appropriate step toward
a level playing field. However, as vehicle users are charged
increasingly for consuming public resources, such special
treatment would ultimately be neither needed nor warranted. Assuming, say, $400 billion a year in roadway user
fees plus parking cash-outs, and assuming for simplicity that
all such revenues were rebated to the adult citizenry pro rata,
non-drivers would gain almost $2,000 a year each. This is far
more than enough to finance each cyclist's parking and
washup facilities.
Pricing roadway travel will not solve all problems of
transportation. To continue with the cycling example, bike
riders still need safe access to roadway facilities. In fact, social provision of a travel infrastructure will become more, not
less important, as public revenues available for transportation grow and non-automotive transport options become more
70. Entitlements for miles not driven parallel the concept of negawattsutility payments for conserved electricity-pioneered by Amory Lovins in the
electricity sector.
71. See Herman et al., supra note 27, at 97.
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highly valued for avoiding societal harms. Equally essential
as pricing-based incentives will be non-monetary changes in
transport policy-zoning modifications to permit higher densities and reduced parking; improved facilities for non-motorized vehicles; better intercity rail and bus service; easier
availability of neighborhood car rentals and utility vehicle coops; transit-pedestrian oriented residential development, and
so forth.
Still, movement toward full-cost pricing of roadway
travel is the sine qua non of solving America's transportation
problems. Even radically improved transit, cycling and walking will never compete effectively with cars, 72 unless subsidies for driving are slashed, parking and insurance costs are
metered, and car and truck travel is made to pay its own way.
This analysis is intended as a first step toward careful
consideration of a comprehensive program of roadway pricing. Although the figures here are at the national level, most
of the measures outlined here could be implemented locallyas they should, reflecting local damages from vehicle use and
local needs. 73 Let the debate multiply; the harms from overdependence on motor vehicles are massive, and our society
and environment cannot wait for cures.

72. U.S. General Accounting Office, Reducing Vehicle Emissions With
TransportationControl Measures, Aug. 1993, concluded that traditional measures such as transit and ridesharing were unlikely to reduce vehicle emissions
by more than several percent in most metropolitan areas, whereas marketbased measures had far greater potential
73. For a rough sketch of a possible local initiative on roadway pricing, see
Komanoff, letter to Richard McClintock, supra note 34.
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